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THE IMPACT OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL
LIABILITY AND INSURANCE
IMPROVEMENT ACT ON INFORMED
CONSENT RECOVERY IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
Frank W. Elliott*
Subchapter F of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improve-
ment Act (the Act)' refers to causes of action against physicians and
health care providers for their failure to make reasonable disclosures
of risks and hazards incident to medical care or surgical procedures.
Prior to this statute, the plaintiff
had the burden to prove by expert medical evidence what a reason-
able medical practitioner of the same school and same or similar
community under the same or similar circumstances would have
disclosed to his patient about the risks incident to a proposed
diagnosis or treatment, that the physician departed from that
standard, causation, and damages. The action is one of malprac-
tice for a physician's failure to conform to medical standards in
obtaining the patient's consent. Regardless of what some earlier
informed consent cases suggest, such an action need not be
pleaded as one for assault and battery.2
Section 6.02 of the Act provides that "the only theory on which
recovery may be obtained is that of negligence in failing to disclose
the risks or hazards that could have influenced a reasonable person
in making a decision to give or withhold consent."3 The Act does not
change the proof requirements for breach, causation, and damages,
but slight substantive change is made in the general duty of disclo-
sure. However, the remainder of the subchapter makes a significant
change in the method of establishing what should be disclosed.
THE TEXAS MEDICAL DISCLOSURE PANEL
Under the Act, the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel, which con-
sists of three attorneys and six physicians, is charged with the re-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law; B.A., University of
Texas, 1951; LL.B., University of Texas, 1957.
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, Subch. F (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
2. Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967).
3. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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sponsibility of determining which "risks or hazards" should be dis-
closed, and the extent of the disclosure.' The Panel has the stag-
gering task of identifying and examining all medical treatments and
surgical procedures in which physicians and health care providers
may be involved.- The Panel then must determine which treat-
ments and procedures require disclosure and those which do not.,
For those treatments and procedures on the required disclosure
list, the degree of disclosure required and the form of the disclosure
are to be established.7 The lists with written explanations of the
degree and form of the required disclosure are to be published in the
Texas Register.! The lists are to be supplemented with newly devel-
oped medical treatments and surgical procedures, and by inference,
the Panel may alter or modify disclosure requirements on the origi-
nal lists.' These lists and explanations provide the basis for the duty
of disclosure of physicians and health care providers.
DUTY OF PHYSICIAN OR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
The general duty of disclosure of a physician or health care
provider is found in Section 6.02 of the Act. That duty is to "disclose
the risks or hazards that could have influenced a reasonable person
in making a decision to give or withhold consent."' 0 However,
whether that duty was performed is to be determined by the specific
duty of disclosure as it is described in Section 6.05. If the medical
treatment or surgical procedure appears on the Panel's required
disclosure list, then the physician or health care provider must dis-
close the risks and hazards involved. The final sentence in the sec-
tion provides that "[a] physician or health care provider shall be
considered to have complied with the requirements of this section
if disclosure is made as provided in Section 6.06 of this subchap-
ter.""
Section 6.06 provides the requirements for an effective consent
to a treatment or procedure.' 2 Considered together, Sections 6.05
4. Id. § 6.03.
5. Id. § 6.04(a).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 6.04(b).
8. Id. § 6.04(c).
9. Id. § 6.04(d).
10. Id. § 6.02.
11. Id. § 6.05.
12. Id. § 6.06.
Consent to medical care that appears on the panel's list requiring disclosure
shall be considered effective under this subchapter if it is given in writing, signed
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and 6.06 appear to establish that the duty of the physician or health
care provider is to disclose the risks and hazards of procedures on
the required disclosure lists. To have an effective consent the disclo-
sure must be written, it must be in the form and to the extent re-
quired by the Panel, and the writing must be signed by the patient
or his representative and a witness. However, as will be discussed,
the extent of this disclosure duty is questionable because of the
language concerning presumptions in Section 6.07, and the legisla-
tive history of that language. Because of these factors, the interpre-
tation of the statutory duty is difficult if not impossible.
As the statute was initially drafted, the language of Section
6.07(a)(1) provided that a disclosure in compliance with Section
6.06 or the failure to disclose risks of a procedure on the no-
requirement list "shall be deemed to constitute compliance as a
matter of law with the requirements of [Section 6.061 of the arti-
cle.' 3 When the legislation was finally enacted, this language had
been changed to "shall create a rebuttable presumption that the
requirements of Sections 6.05 and 6.06 of this subchapter have been
complied with . . . .""
There are two problems with Section 6.07(a)(1). First, Section
6.06 provides that consent shall be effective under the subchapter
if disclosure is in writing, in proper form, properly signed and wit-
nessed. Therefore, Section 6.07(a)(1) is redundant with respect to
actual disclosure, and so would have effect only with respect to the
case in which the Panel says no disclosure is necessary. In addi-
tion, Section 6.07(a)(1) as originally written provided that disclo-
sure made as required by Section 6.06 would be deemed compliance
with Section 6.06. In other words, if disclosure is made in writing,
in the proper form, properly signed, and witnessed, it would be
deemed compliance with the requirement to make the disclosure in
writing, and satisfy the duty of disclosure. Of course, if no disclosure
were required, and none was made, then under the original statutory
language, that also would be deemed to be compliance with the
disclosure requirements. This would mean that compliance with
Section 6.06 created an irrebuttable presumption that the duty of
disclosure had been satisfied. In an advisory letter the Texas Attor-
by the patient or a person authorized to give the consent and by a competent
witness, and if the written consent specifically states the risks and hazards that are
involved in the medical care or surgical procedure in the form and to the degree
required by the panel . . ..
Id.
13. TEX. H.R.J. 1029 (1977) (emphasis added).
14. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.05. 6.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) (em-
phasis added).
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ney General concluded that this irrebuttable presumption violated
the guarantee of trial by jury.' In response to this opinion, the
language of Section 6.07(a)(1) was changed to create a rebuttable
presumption of compliance rather than compliance as a matter of
law. However, the language of Section 6.06 that consent "shall be
considered effective" was not changed. "
Under Section 6.07(a)(1), if the physician or health care provi-
der discloses to the patient, or person authorized to consent for the
patient, the risks and hazards involved in the care or procedure that
appears on the required disclosure list, then first, the fact of the
disclosure and possibly the fact that the procedure or treatment is
on the required disclosure list are admissible in evidence. Second,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the physician or health care
provider has disclosed to the patient, or person authorized to con-
sent for the patient, the risks and hazards involved in the care or
procedure that appears on the required disclosure list, and there is
a presumption that the disclosure was made in writing, in the form,
and to the degree required by the Panel, was properly signed, and
was witnessed. Finally, the presumption shall be included in the
charge to the jury.
In addition, under Section 6.07,11 if the care or procedure ap-
pears on the no-requirement list and there has been no disclosure,
then either fact is admissible in evidence. Again, there is a rebutta-
ble presumption that the physician or health care provider has dis-
15. TEX. Arr'y GEN. LA-135 (1977):
Since the utilization of the signed form would constitute consent as a matter
of law, the jury would be unable to inquire into the actual validity of the consent.
Presumably the form could be signed by a person who could not read or by an
individual who was not competent to understand the document. Yet the statute
would make such consent effective without further inquiry. What has been a fact
issue would be taken from the jury's consideration and would be transformed into
an irrebutable presumption. Where the statute makes signature on the form conclu-
sive on the issue of consent, it would be a denial of the constitutional right to have
the issue determined by a jury. Floeck v. State, 30 S.W. 794, 795-96 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1895).
Id.
Whether or not one agrees that the precedent by way of dicta in a criminal case applies
to this situation, the Attorney General has spoken.
16. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
17. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.07(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). Section
6.07(a)(1) reads:
IFlailure to disclose based on inclusion of any medical care or surgical procedure
on the panel's list for which disclosure is not required shall be admissible in evi-
dence and shall create a rebuttable presumption that the requirements of Sections
6.05 and 6.06 of this subchapter have been complied with and this presumption
shall be included in the charge to the jury.
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closed to the patient, or person authorized to consent for the pa-
tient, the risks and hazards involved in the care or procedure should
it appear on the required disclosure list, and also that the disclosure
was made in writing, in the form, and to the degree required by the
Panel, was properly signed, and was witnessed. The section also
provides that the presumption shall be included in the charge to the
jury. Although inconsistent and illogical, the failure to disclose the
risks and hazards incident to procedures on the no-requirement list
in effect raises a presumption that disclosure was made in the pro-
per form.
Section 6.07(a)(2)' s is rather straightforward in comparison to
Section 6.07(a)(1). Under Section 6.07(a)(2) the failure to disclose
risks and hazards incident to any medical care on the required dis-
closure list is admissible in evidence. However, it is again unclear
whether the fact that the procedure was on the required disclosure
list is also admissible. Further, this section creates a rebuttable
presumption that the failure to disclose was negligent. Finally, the
presumption of negligence shall be included in the charge to the
jury. The statutory proviso that "failure to disclose may be found
not to be negligent if there was an emergency or if for some other
reason it was not medically feasible to make a disclosure of the kind
that would otherwise have been negligence""' is unclear. The failure
to disclose may not be negligence in the case of an emergency treat-
ment. However, the failure to disclose may also not be negligence if
there is some reason why it was not medically feasible to make a
disclosure that otherwise would have been required. This excusable
nondisclosure must depend in each case on the physician's judg-
ment that the disclosure would generate stress and be detrimental
to the patient's health.
In summary, the subchapter applies to suits against physicians
or health care providers for liability claims based on the failure
adequately to disclose the risks and hazards incident to medical
care rendered by the physician or health care provider. Negligence
is the only theory of recovery, and there is liability for the failure to
disclose risks or hazards that could have influenced a reasonable
person in making a decision to give or withhold consent. "' Whether
the medical care requires a disclosure of risks and hazards is to be
decided by a panel."
18. Id. § 6.07(a)(2).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 6.02.
21. Id. §§ 6.03, 6.04.
1979]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
If the care or procedure is on the required disclosure list, the
physician or health care provider has a duty to disclose risks and
hazards prior to obtaining the patient's consent." The written dis-
closure must state specifically the risks and hazards involved, and
the patient's signed consent must be witnessed.23 A written instru-
ment conforming to those requirements is admissible in evidence,
and it creates a rebuttable presumption that the duty of disclosure
has been performed. Evidence of forgery, incompetency, or illiteracy
of the patient, or other evidence relevant to invalidity of the con-
sent, would rebut the presumption of adequate disclosure. 4
If the care or procedure is on the required disclosure list and the
statutory disclosure requirements are not met, the fact that disclo-
sure is required is admissible in evidence and creates a rebuttable
presumption of negligence. The presumption may be rebutted by
evidence of an emergency or medical reason for nondisclosure. 5-
However, if the care or procedure is on the no-requirement list, then
there is no duty to disclose any risks or hazards." Finally, if the care
or procedure is not found on either list, then the statute does not
apply, and the common law rules apply. 7
PRESUMPTION
It is important to examine the effect of the "presumptions"
created by this subchapter. Texas cases have established that the
use of presumptions is only a device for placing the burden of pro-
ducing evidence.2" In the most common form of presumption, once
the party in whose favor the presumption is to operate has estab-
lished the basic fact that gives rise to presumed facts, then the
burden of producing evidence to disprove the presumed facts is
upon the other party. If no rebuttal evidence is produced, the pre-
sumed fact is established. If evidence disproving the presumed fact
is produced, then the presumption vanishes, and the original party
must prove the presumed fact by evidence as though the presump-
tion had never existed. The evidence that established the basic fact
may also tend to prove the presumed fact. However, if it does not,
22. Id. § 6.05.
23. Id. § 6.06.
24. Id. § 6.07(a)(1).
25. Id. § 6.07(a)(2).
26. Id. §§ 6.05, 6.07(a)(1).
27. Id. § 6.07(b).
28. See Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1971); ELLIOTT,
Annual Survey of Texas Law: Evidence, 26 Sw. L.J. 185, 187 (1972).
[Vol. 10:381
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and no further evidence is introduced tending to prove the presumed
fact, then there is "no evidence" of the presumed fact, and no issues
would be submitted.
Similar to the presumption is the res ipsa loquitur inference. In
res ipsa loquitur, the initial facts, when established, give rise to an
inference of negligence. Regardless of the evidence introduced to
rebut negligence, the initial facts are sufficient for res ipsa to be
submitted to the jury. The jury may infer negligence from the exist-
ance of the initial facts. 21 The "presumptions" that appear in Sec-
tion 6.07 do not fit into either the form of the general presumption
or res ipsa loquitur inference. The jury is told of the presumption of
disclosure. However, in some situations the presumption appears to
do more than place the burden of producing evidence. Even if con-
sidered as analogous to a res ipsa inference, there is some effect on
the burden of persuasion.
The two presumptions created by Section 6.07 have different
applications. The first presumption is that created under Section
6.07(a)(1). The basic fact necessary for this presumption is the
existence of the written consent required by Section 6.06. When that
consent is in evidence, the presumption is raised that the duty of
disclosure has been performed, or that there was no negligence.
Because the plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence of the
defendant's negligent nondisclosure, it is unusual that the burden
of producing the basic evidence to raise the presumption of disclo-
sure should be on the defendant. Perhaps this results from the fact
that disclosure and consent were at one time affirmative defenses
to actions for assault and battery, the original theories used in medi-
cal malpractice cases.
In any event, it appears that evidence that could rebut the
presumption of disclosure under Section 6.07(a)(1) is evidence that
would attack the validity of the consent. If the plaintiff fails to rebut
the presumed validity of the written consent, then there is no issue
raised for submission to the jury, and a directed verdict for the
defendant should be entered. However, the plaintiff may rebut this
presumption by submitting evidence of the incompetency of the
signing patient or witness, by showing that the consent form was not
read, by showing that there was no opportunity to read the paper,
or by submitting some other evidence that tends to show a lack of
the disclosure intended under Section 6.07.
In Texas, the introduction of rebuttal evidence would cause the
29. See Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974).
1979]
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presumption to disappear. However, because the plaintiff has the
burden of persuasion on the issue of negligence, he still must prove
that no informed consent was given or that the defendant failed to
disclose the risks and hazards involved. This creates a problem of
how to include the presumption of disclosure in the charge to the
jury. Perhaps the only way this can be done is by an instruction to
the jury on the weight of the evidence. 0
The second presumption to be considered is found in Section
6.07(a)(2). The basic facts of this presumption are that the pre-
scribed care or procedure is found on the required disclosure list and
that the required disclosure was not made. When those facts are
established by the plaintiff, the presumption is raised that the de-
fendant was negligent in failing to disclose. To rebut this presump-
tion the defendant must produce evidence of an emergency, or of
circumstances indicating the medical infeasibility of disclosure, or
of the inadvisability of disclosure because of the patient's condition.
If no rebuttal evidence is produced, there is no negligence issue for
submission to the jury, and negligence is established as a matter of
law. However, if there is rebuttal evidence, the method of submis-
sion of the negligence issue is unclear. In this instance, the issue is
not, as it was under Section 6.07(a)(1), whether there was a failure
to disclose; rather the issue is whether the admitted failure to dis-
close was negligent."
30. The issue to be presented to the jury in this instance would be whether the defen-
dant failed to disclose the risks and hazards involved. The jury instruction would be: You
are instructed that because there is evidence that the disclosure of the risks and hazards of
the procedure was made in writing, in the form and to the degree established by the Medical
Disclosure Panel, and because there is evidence that consent to the care or procedure was
given in the same writing, signed by the patient for one authorized to sign for the patientl,
and by a witness, you must find that the defendant did disclose the risks and hazards involved
unless the plaintiff has established a failure properly to disclose by a preponderance of the
evidence.
31. The special issue could be framed thus: Do you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the failure to disclose the risks and hazards involved was negligence?
The term "NEGLIGENCE," as used in this issue, means the failure to disclose the risks
or hazards that could have influenced a reasonable person in making a decision to give or
withhold consent.
You are instructed that the risks and hazards involved were required to be disclosed by
the Medical Disclosure Panel. Therefore, you may find that the failure to disclose was negli-
gent. However, the failure to disclose may be found not to be negligent if the defendant were
confronted by an emergency which arose suddenly, unexpectedly and not proximately caused
by negligence on the part of the defendant, and which to a reasonable physician required
immediate action without time for explanation. [or] However the failure to disclose may be
found not to be negligent if because of [state some other reason] it was not medically feasible
to make a disclosure of the proper kind.
[Vol. 10:381
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CONCLUSION
The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
32
provides the mechanism for a Panel determination of informed
consent standards. The only exceptions to these statutory stan-
dards will be in instances in which there is an emergency, medical
reason for nondisclosure, or procedures for which the Panel has not
determined the informed consent standards. Although it would
appear that both the medical and legal professions would benefit
from a standardization of informed consent requirements, it should
also be noted that there is a corresponding restriction in the appli-
cation of a medical malpractice cause of action based on the lack
of informed consent. In addition, the presumptions of adequate dis-
closure that arise from statutory compliance need further clarifica-
tion if the Act is to effectuate the legislative intent.
32. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, Subch. F (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).

